Earlier in the day, senior advocate Darius Khambata, who was appearing for a Parsi Zoroastrian woman, argued that the rights of denominational groups could not trample upon the individual rights of believers
| Photo Credit: SUSHIL KUMAR VERMA
The Supreme Court on Wednesday (May 6, 2026) questioned the maintainability of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) or writ petitions challenging the authority of Dawoodi Bohra community leaders to excommunicate their members.
In 2023, the court had referred to a nine-judge Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on whether the practice of excommunication in the Dawoodi Bohra community could continue as a “protected practice” despite the coming into force of the Maharashtra Protection of People from Social Boycott (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act of 2016.
The writ petitions had challenged a 1962 judgment of a five-judge Constitution Bench in the Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin vs The State Of Bombay case. This judgment had upheld the Dawoodi Bohra community leader’s power of excommunication as a part of the “management of religious affairs” enshrined in Article 26(b) of the Constitution. The Dawoodi Bohra reference was later tagged with the Sabarimala case.
On Wednesday (May 6), Justice B.V. Nagarathna, a member of the nine-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, asked senior advocate Raju Ramachandran, appearing for the writ petitioners, if a Constitution Bench judgment, that too one which had held the fort for over 60 years, could be challenged through PILs, however “reformist” they may intend to be. The judge said the maintainability of the petitions required to be looked into first.
“The road taken or the means must be as good as the ends… You are asking us to set aside a Constitution Bench judgment by filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution? We are also ultimately conditioned by the hard, rigid discipline on us. How can we disregard a Constitution Bench judgment on the basis of Article 32 petitions?” Justice Nagarathna asked.
Mr. Ramachandran replied that the petitions in this case had not been “lightly drafted” unlike “some recent writ petitions which were entertained, unfortunately and wrongly, by the Supreme Court showing not only a lack of judicial discipline but also a lack of judicial statesmanship”.
He referred to the writ petitions challenging the validity of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991, which protected the religious character of places of worship as they existed on August 15, 1947.
“One day, a Constitution Bench says the Places of Worship Act is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. The next day, when a writ petition is filed challenging the validity of the Places of Worship Act, the court issued notice, creating all levels of tension that the court had to give an interim order saying further suits will be stayed… These are instances which need great circumspection,” Mr. Ramachandran addressed the Bench.
The 2016 Act of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly had identified 16 types of social ostracisation, making them all illegal, and punishing the perpetrators with imprisonment for up to three years. One among the 16 was excommunication.
Mr. Ramachandran submitted that excommunication in the Dawoodi Bohra community directly impinged upon human dignity.
“Therefore, the issue is not about the mere imposition of religious discipline, which one may assume every religion requires in order to preserve its flock. The question is about the proportionality of the punishment and its impact upon human dignity,” he submitted.
Earlier in the day, senior advocate Darius Khambata, who was appearing for a Parsi Zoroastrian woman, argued that the rights of denominational groups could not trample upon the individual rights of believers. He submitted that Article 26(b) was intended to protect the autonomy of a religious denomination against the state, and not to be used against a believer.
Published – May 06, 2026 10:27 pm IST
