Every democracy must periodically redraw its electoral map to reflect population change. In India, this process is known as delimitation. On paper, it is a routine constitutional adjustment. In reality, the next delimitation exercise — due after Census 2027 — will be the most consequential redrawing of political power since Independence. It will redefine how seats are distributed in the Lok Sabha and how India understands fairness, federalism and regional balance.
The Constitution required delimitation after every Census. But this principle has been suspended for nearly half a century. Inter-State distribution of Lok Sabha seats has remained unchanged since 1976, frozen at 1971 Census figures so that States would not be penalised for controlling population growth. The 84th Amendment in 2001 specified that redistribution would remain suspended until “the first census taken after the year 2026”.
That suspension effectively expires with Census 2027. At present, representation still rests on an India of 548 million people (1971), not today’s 1.47 billion reality.
Delimitation is time consuming. India’s four previous Commissions took between three and five-and-a-half years — and the last one (2002–08) only redrew internal constituency boundaries without reallocating seats among States. The next Commission would probably reallocate seats among States for the first time since 1976, redraw all constituencies, and create reserved constituencies for women’s 33% quota. Even if Census 2027 data is published in 2028, completing delimitation before 2031-32 seems impossible. As a result, women’s reservation cannot be implemented before the 2034 elections. But we cannot rule out surprises.
The complexity around numbers
In the 1970s, fertility rates across States were similar. Today, they have sharply diverged. The southern and western States achieved below-replacement fertility through investments in education, health and women’s empowerment. Northern States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar continue recording higher population growth. If population alone determines representation, States that controlled growth will lose political weight, while those that did not will gain significantly.
The numbers are stark. According to delimitation projections, if seats were allocated purely by population in an expanded Lok Sabha of approximately 888 members, Uttar Pradesh would rise from 80 to 151 seats and Bihar from 40 to 82 — just over 26% combined. Tamil Nadu would have 53 seats (from 39) and Kerala 23 (from 20). Though their absolute numbers rise, their share in the total Lok Sabha strength would fall from 7.2% to 6.0% and 3.7% to 2.6%, respectively, as the northern States gain disproportionately. This creates a moral paradox. Why should States be punished for good governance? For 50 years, India urged States to implement population control. Those who succeeded now stand to lose representation. The logic which forced the freeze in 1976 and 2001 is still valid.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah stated in 2025 that “not even one seat will be reduced” for any southern State. But this promise cannot offset the imbalance if northern States gain massively — or it may require suspending constitutionally mandated redistribution altogether, inviting legal challenge.
The arithmetic reveals a deeper complexity. Even if southern States retain their current seat numbers in an expanded House, their influence diminishes significantly. Parliament functions on absolute numbers, not proportions. When the combined strength of U.P. and Bihar rises to over a quarter of the House, the bargaining power of other regions inevitably declines — despite the promise being kept technically.
Options worth pondering over
There are six options that merit debate.
First, extend the current freeze beyond 2026, delaying redistribution until fertility rates converge. This preserves current balances but denies fast-growing States fair representation (a legitimate concern) and risks constitutional challenge under Article 14, as unequal representation based on 50-year-old data undermines the principle of equal suffrage.
Second, expand the Lok Sabha from 543 to, say, 750 or 888 seats, ensuring that no State loses seats; some gain more. However, proportional distribution means that larger States still get bigger shares, leaving southern concerns unaddressed.
Third, adopt a weighted formula: 80% weight for population, 20% for development indicators such as literacy, health, or sustained fertility control — analogous to how the Finance Commission uses composite indicators for tax devolution. This rewards governance outcomes, not just population size. The ratio could be 70:30.
Fourth, strengthen the Rajya Sabha as a genuinely federal chamber. Earlier, domicile requirements ensured that Members represented the States from which they were elected. Now, anyone can be elected from anywhere, weakening that link. The domicile condition must be restored. Additionally, Rajya Sabha seats remain distributed largely by population — Uttar Pradesh has 31 seats while Sikkim has one — blunting its federal purpose. Consider adopting the American system of equal seats a State, irrespective of size (California 39 million, Wyoming 0.5 million both have two Senators). An Indian model could be evolved which could have three tiers: largest States (15 seats each), medium States (10 seats), smallest States (five seats). Within each tier, States would have equal representation regardless of population, balancing federalism and restoring the Rajya Sabha’s moderating role.
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Fifth, bifurcate Uttar Pradesh into three or four States to neutralise its excessive weight. U.P. was already divided in 2000 to create Uttarakhand, and movements for Bundelkhand and Purvanchal Statehood have persisted for decades. If U.P.’s projected 151 seats were divided among four States (about 38 seats each), no single State would dominate — making this a federalism solution, not just an administrative one.
Sixth, implement phased redistribution across two election cycles. Reallocate half the adjusted seats in 2034, the remainder in 2039, giving States and parties time to adapt. This reduces political shock while honouring constitutional requirements.
The need for careful navigation
Delimitation will reshape coalition politics fundamentally. If two States command a quarter of Lok Sabha seats, the mathematics of government formation changes entirely. Regional parties that historically provided parliamentary balance would find their leverage reduced, regardless of absolute seat numbers. The choice between constitutional fairness and political stability requires navigating this structural tension carefully.
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Beyond formulas, procedure matters. The Delimitation Commission should include experts in demography, constitutional law and federal studies, with meaningful State representation. Transparency, extensive public hearings and robust oversight are essential.
The next delimitation will also redraw internal constituency boundaries — considering geography, administrative convenience, and Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) representation. While the number of SC and ST reserved constituencies is determined by strict population proportion, the location of specific SC constituencies involves Commission discretion, potentially creating scope for manipulation.” The ST formula should apply to both.
Delimitation is a national milestone that will redistribute political voice and shape coalition politics for decades. Done well, it can reaffirm India’s unity and modernise representation. Done poorly, it can deepen distrust and injure the federal spirit.
The Census will measure India’s population; delimitation will measure its democracy. Once Census data is released, positions will harden and consensus will fade —making now the moment for dialogue.
Is Tamil Nadu’s delimitation formula practical?
If guided by transparency, empathy and shared justice, the exercise can renew faith in federalism and democracy. But if driven by political arithmetic alone, it may redraw the moral balance of the Republic itself.
S.Y. Quraishi is a former Chief Election Commissioner of India and is the author of An Undocumented Wonder: The Making of the Great Indian Election
