There have been recurrent media reports of arrests of Muslims from diverse social and professional backgrounds — they include gym owners, medical practitioners, and religious clerics — on allegations of participating in organised networks that facilitate religious conversion from Hinduism to Islam. These reports have predominantly emerged from North India, particularly Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Most of the cases remain under investigation. If substantiated, such developments could indicate a new form of ideological churn within segments of Muslim society in India. Otherwise, they risk being perceived as manufactured narratives driven by an ideologically motivated state.
The last widely acknowledged instance of mass conversion to Islam in India occurred in February 1981 in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu, where 558 Dalits embraced Islam to escape entrenched caste oppression. Reflecting on the episode, Atal Bihari Vajpayee observed that Hindu society suffered from long-standing ills, particularly distinctions based on birth and caste. The conversions were thus rooted in inequalities internal to Hindu society.
Also Read | What we know so far about the Supreme Court’s ruling on reservation for converted Dalits
Contentious issue
Religious conversion — particularly from Hinduism to Islam and Christianity — has long been a contentious issue. Mahatma Gandhi, in particular, according to Laura D. Jenkins, author of Religious Freedom and Mass Conversion in India, viewed mass conversions not only as a threat to the poor and the uneducated but also to anti-colonial unity.
The most symbolically powerful conversion in modern Indian history was that of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who embraced Buddhism in 1956. On October 13, 1935, Ambedkar had declared his intention to leave Hinduism at the Depressed Classes Conference in Yeola. He said, “I was born a Hindu, but I will not die a Hindu.” For Ambedkar, conversion was an act of emancipation. In the intervening period, he repeatedly urged Dalits to leave Hinduism for any religion of their choice, including Islam.
He even took the initiative for Dalits to convert to Sikhism, which found unexpected support from Dr. B.S. Moonje, a prominent leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, who encouraged Hindu leaders to endorse the conversion. However, this met opposition from Mahatma, C. Rajagopalachari and Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya. One of Gandhi’s principal arguments against Ambedkar leaving Hinduism was the belief that Dalit followers would abandon him once he ceased to be a Hindu. Had Gandhi been alive today, he would have realised how profoundly mistaken this assessment was. The enduring reverence for Ambedkar among Dalits, despite, and indeed because of, his conversion, stands as a powerful rebuttal to that prognosis.
EXPLAINED | What is the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Bill?
Over the decades
Concerns surrounding religious conversion and legislative attempts to regulate conversion began even under the colonial administration. For instance, the Raigarh State Conversion Act (1936) and the Patna Freedom of Religion Act (1942) sought to monitor conversions. The question of religious freedom and conversion was debated in the Constituent Assembly, culminating in the formulation of Article 25(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion. But constitutional recognition of religious freedom did not produce lasting political or social consensus.
In independent India, a series of anti-conversion laws have been enacted and periodically amended by various secular governments well before Hindu nationalists emerged as a dominant electoral force, primarily in response to concerns over Christian missionary activities. The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act (1967) and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam (1968) are prominent examples. However, Hindutva right organisations argued that these laws are inadequate to effectively curb religious conversion.
Also Read | Supreme Court issues notices to 12 States on plea over anti-conversion laws
Specific instances
Consequently, several States ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have amended existing legislation. The scope of these laws has expanded beyond concerns about Christian missionary activity to include conversions to Islam, particularly in the context of allegations framed as “love jihad”. The Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act (UFRA), 2018, for instance, illustrates this trajectory. The law was further tightened in 2022, with enhanced penalties, including longer prison terms. In 2025, the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Bill, 2025 proposed increasing punishment from three to 10 years, extending up to 20 years or even life imprisonment in extreme cases. However, these have not yet been notified, as the Bill was returned by the Governor for reconsideration. The implementation of these laws has generated significant legal disputes.
Under the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Act, 2022, reports indicate that 20 cases were filed in 2023 and 18 more by September 2025. Of the cases brought to full trial under the 2018 Act, several have resulted in acquittal. Such legislation has not been confined to BJP-ruled States. The Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act (2006), for example, was enacted under a Congress government, and the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act 2002, introduced by the J. Jayalalithaa-led AIADMK government and later modified in 2006 by the M. Karunanidhi-led DMK government. This underscores the broader political consensus across ideological lines on regulating religious conversion.
These acts, in practice, have often encouraged vigilantism, leading to instances of violence and disruptions to India’s secular social fabric. Therefore, it is imperative that governments review these acts.
Published – April 06, 2026 12:40 am IST
